Formed in Okinawa the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the first major U.S. Army combat unit to enter the war organized under the Pacific Command (PACOM)...a highly spirited mobile unit made from core elements of the 503rd Airborne Infantry that made the famed airborne assault liberating the Island of Corregidor in WW-II creating its Pacific legacy. The Brigade later became famous at the Battle of Dak To—the unit's single most costly battle of the American Indo-China War earning the Presidential Unit Citation in 1967 and making the only major combat jump in Viet Nam...'Operation Junction City.'

  [Other decorated combat elements]* that formed the principal strength of the Brigade included elements of the 1/50th (Mech) Infantry and the 17th Cav., 61st,  134th, 196th and 1/RAR supported by 1/69th Armor, 2/17th, 5/22nd, 6/84th, 3/319th Airborne and 161st Artillery including 5th Spec. Forces attachments, 2/1st, 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn Gunships and 54th Infantry Radar. Infantry elements, Marines, Navy and Air Force historically¹ (see AAA footnote) organized special operations or provisional operating forces that were seasoned—proficient with quick insertion and extraction capability, highly motivated and trained to carry out combat missions in response to intelligence information while conducting unconventional combat operations. 
*  Subject to editorial review 
   One such unit, authorized during the summer of 1968 by the Brigade Command of BG Richard J. Allen followed by BG John W. Barnes was formed on 21 Aug 68 under the Battalion and Operations Command of LTC John B. Carter and Maj. Anthony J. Juliano. Once authorization was secured Maj. Juliano, the formidable Airborne Ranger qualified Operations CO who planned formation of the legendary unit⁶ along with SFC Holloway as the unit's platoon leader began the tough selection process to compliment seasoned hand-picked individuals previously selected by screening ^[1-1] volunteers from line companies—instilling training⁴ based on Ranger, Pathfinder and Airborne qualifications and expertise within the Battalion.
 
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 ¹(AAA footnote) There always are and our country will always need those men who are willing and able to meet the standards of being elite...the best among the best! In our Armed Forces they are known by many names but they are 'cut from the same cloth'! ...each of our Armed Forces has units that meet these standards. Each has a mission unique to their service but all are 'elite'!  The bottom line is that the standards they set and meet encourages others to emulate them! Compliments of Edward Therens, MSG, USA (Ret) and Courtesy of American Airborne Association, Airborne Quarterly,Winter 06-Spring 07, William E. Weber, Col., USA (Ret), Exec. Editor.
⁶ The platoon that regularly numbered...became known as 'SRAP' (Short Range Ambush Patrol) or "Holloway's Raiders," names given the platoon by its members...and we all felt a high sense of pride and humility being part of that and its mission. — Eldridge H. Holloway, SGM, USA (Ret), Sept. 8-9, 2005 @ Kennesaw, (Marietta) GA. — Statement Apr 5, 2006  
                                                                                                          
                                                       
                                                                                       
                          AIRBORNE...it is a single word recognized the world over as the best...a single word that strikes fear
                                        in the heart of adversaries...a single word that stands for all that is good and great about America!  
                                                    — Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ret) from his remarks at the 
                                                                   "60th Anniversary of the Airborne at Ft. Benning, GA., April 13, 2000" ²
                            

  The unit quickly became known as SRAP (Short Range Ambush Patrol) or 'Holloway's Raiders' out of respect for the legendary platoon leader who developed his combat skills both in navigation and tactical ground intelligence three years earlier—providing helicopter guidance and conducting ambush and reconnaissance operations with the 1st Squadron, 9th Cav, 1st Cav Div. during the battle of the Ia Drang Valley. The unit was later commanded by Ranger(s) qualified 1Lt. Leon "Larry" E. Walker, Jr., 1Lt. Curtis E. Harper and 1Lt. Floyd J. Carter, III. Consistent with the unit's mission SRAP conducted special operations while the Battalion was based in the Central Highlands and at LZ Uplift including the inland coastal waters in Binh Dinh Province — a regional enemy stronghold known as 'The Crescent.'

  During this period the SRAP repeatedly conducted clandestine operations in enemy territory establishing ambush sites, engaging enemy forces and gathering valuable intelligence information for the Battalion as well as the Brigade. In keeping with SRAP's assigned mission, unit members participated in over 100 ambush patrols including over 60 aerial insertions and extractions. With a history of strong, effective leadership, SRAP's primary mission was a quick-strike, ready reaction force operating from intelligence throughout the Highlands' region and other areas of operation.       
                                                           
  When the Battalion moved east to LZ Uplift near Bong Son the SRAP unit conducted both airmobile and amphibious operations setting up APB Carol on the inland coastal waters of the Dam Tra O organized by LTC James R. Woodall using inflatable rafts and airboats. The unit was commanded by 1Lts. Curtis E. Harper, Albert L. Parsley, Jr. and Floyd J. Carter, III before disbanding operations and moving to Phan Tiet in the fall of 1969.

  During SRAP's engagement as a provisional combat unit with directives from Brigade Command HQ there were very few casualties with the exception of an operation that went awry leaving wounded most of their 15 man team while ending a major strike against Pump Station 8 near LZ Action by elements of what was believed to be the 95B NVA Regiment operating in the Central Highlands' fierce region of the Mang Yang Pass. The action occurred east of Pleiku near the east entrance of the Pass during the late night and early morning of 21 March 1969 south of the pump station garrison referred to as "Little Dien Bien Phu"³ by armored tank personnel from the 1/69th, 4th Infantry Division.

 Although "insertions¹ were mostly accomplished by our 'Blackhawk' aerial support group"—Anthony J. Juliano, LTC, USA (Ret), SRAP was covertly inserted inside a column of several armored personnel carriers. Once the column reached about half way between the fire base and the pump station (2.4 km) the column slowed and members of the patrol quickly exited from three tracks deployed in the center of the column. As it was getting dark, SRAP members moved off the road in a westward direction and the tracks or APC's acting as decoys continued moving unabated towards the pump station. Patrol members continued to hump west for about 1/2 to 3/4 click then abruptly changed direction and headed north 1/2 click towards the pump station. Under the cover of darkness the patrol immediately took up their positions and quickly—as they had done many times before—set up the necessary communications including ordnance to engage and destroy the enemy.
— Mark E. Gladson, Michael McFarland, Ventura ("Doc") Rodriguez, Robert Sollars, Andrew J. Soltis, Jr., Larry E. Walker, Jr.,1LT  (former notable SRAP team members) March 69 & May/June 2008; As for insertion¹ of 20 Mar 69...I must say that APC's were used [in connection with insertion] to cover most of the distance [4.8 km or 3 miles OTR]... — LTC (Ret) Anthony J. Juliano, 4 June 2008 (former BN Operations/SRAP CO who planned operation, 20-21 Mar 1969.  
_________________
¹(Editor's footnote): Given the certain unlikelihood of surprising the enemy perhaps one of its 'finer' attributes aside from firepower is its covert ability to insert a small patrol or raiding party undetected by enemy forces. As surprising the enemy is absolutely necessary [and to minimize casualties] the method of insertion as on 20 March 69 ["a stratagem not to be seen"] plays a vital strategic role "affecting" the success of any planned operation. With insertions both by its aerial support helicopters and use of armored personnel carriers from the Battalion including its inflated assault rafts, SRAP operations went undetected (consistent with command/unit operating procedures) prior to engagement by enemy forces. "...to the best of my knowledge the SRAP was transported by APC to the vicinity of Pump Station 8...preceding the battle."  — Col. James R. Woodall, USA (Ret), 8 Jun 2008.  
 
(Editor's end note): See published document 'Our War Stories' #67, SRAP Ambush Mar 21, 1969,1st Bn, 50th Infantry Association at www.ichiban1.org   [Rajner/par 5]: "...I carried the team's radio [RTO]....an M-79 ("single-shot, manually loaded") grenade launcher with [72 plus rounds (grenades)...Claims 
being both an RTO (an "exclusive" role or function) AND a "grenadier" — with severe limitations on firing frequency and  "arming" limitations  likely exceeding the anticipated range of enemy positions...[par 6]  "1Lt Walker led us out of LZ Action for our hike to the ambush site ...Constant training made the walk easy despite our heavy loads."  (see Ed. footnote above par)... ["Web site Committee" ("Sheppard") Comment, 17 Jun/15 Jul 2008]: "...he has been a [reliable reference person] for the 50th Infantry Association..."   Without qualifying or checking its veracity this guy in collusion insults our intelligence [ignoring overwhelming evidence to the contrary] by claiming he (Rajner) has been a reliable reference person — but worse yet, continues to post this fraud on the Association's website supported ($$funded$$) using income from annual/lifetime membership dues of its members. Publishing these pathetic —pompous and spurious claims — coveting valor from the true heroism and sacrifice of many in this Battalion, denigrates this unit's legacy and severely damages the credibility of this Association's leadership...and the HISTORICAL RECORD or ARCHIVES of the 1st Battalion 50th Infantry...... (See disclaimers below)
                                                                                             _________________
                                                                                            
  Once the ambush was sprung against the advancing force by 1Lt. Walker's flanking position, the unit having lost radio contact during the night and receiving heavy incoming mortars suddenly found their remote positions surrounded and engaged in an intense firefight with company size NVA elements attacking all positions. SRAP's ambush and intense firing with automatic weapons and use of grenades against large numbers of attacking enemy forces at 'point-blank' range—combined with the concentrated fire support from the pump station firing quad 50 caliber and 40MM "duster" rounds, blocked the enemy attack and prevented the loss of the pump station garrison and disruption of fuel supply to fuel depots supplying jet aircraft and armored tank patrols in the rugged Highlands' region.   

   Fire support from the small base and armored personnel carriers brought up from the 1/50th, 173rd Airborne Brigade and an armored tank patrol with the 1/69th, 4th Infantry Division were credited with cutting off enemy advances and preventing the annihilation of SRAP positions by heavily armed and supported company size elements from the NVA Regiment. Quick response including air and ground fire support by medivac and from members of Capt. Neglia's Alpha Company was responsible for extraction and early medical attention for Holloway's Raiders led by 1Lt. Larry E. Walker, Jr. but the NVA and VC forces, known to have suffered heavy losses from the SRAP engagement, pulled back and retreated and were left to fight another day! 

  Had radio contact been maintained throughout the night with updated situation reports, air strikes could have been called in preventing the early morning attack—surprising and annihilating the NVA forces and blocking their escape. 

                                                                        

                            'A gathering of eagles'...Eagles do not flock...you have to find them one at a time! 
                                                                                                                                  —H. Ross Perot

  This highly respected and distinguished special operations unit⁴...authorized by Brigade Command under the Battalion and Operations Command of the 1/50 Infantry, LTC John B. Carter & Maj. Anthony J. Juliano, LTC James R. Woodall and Maj. Oren R. Culpepper "...was notably successful...always a great asset to the Battalion and accomplished much more than their strength would indicate." —James R. Woodall, Col., USA (Ret)...while making their mark with the Battalion and the Brigade.
 
  "In the course of forming this unit, a tough selection or screening ^[1-1] process was employed....recruiting seasoned volunteers who were tough and courageous....With intense training....the platoon was highly skilled and respected both in methods of deployment and engagements..." 
 —Eldridge H. Holloway, SGM, USA (Ret)  

   "Consistent with operations in the Highlands' region....SRAP members continued conducting both aerial and ground...insertions under my command but subsequently were assigned amphibious operations...on the inland coastal waters of the Dam Tra O."     — Curtis E. Harper, LTC, USA (Ret) 

   "...I was the senior non-commissioned officer for a provisional [combat] unit conducting special operations against enemy forces...known as 'SRAP.' ...with selected personnel.^[1-1] ..within the Battalion or the Brigade. Operating from intelligence...SRAP's mission was a quick-strike, airmobile inserted commando force trained to engage and destroy the enemy."     — Donald M. Harrington, SGM, USA, (Ret)
                                        
     "SRAP's spirit and methods of operations...earned respect and admiration....from officers and enlisted men in the Battalion and other combat units for their serial display of discipline and gallantry under fire."    — James R. Woodall, Col., USA (Ret)   

  "During this period the SRAP conducted clandestine operations ...establishing ambush sites...and gathering valuable intelligence....Insertions were mostly accomplished by our 'Blackhawk' aerial support unit....their determination, combat experience and a willingness to be the BEST allowed the SRAP to accomplish its assigned mission....Because of their successes the Battalion and Brigade were successful in accomplishing its never ending and varied assignments." — Anthony J. Juliano, LTC, USA (Ret)

  "Late June of 1969 Maj. Culpepper informed me that I was to take over the SRAP unit as Capt. Harper had been assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment. As commanding officer of SRAP...on the inland coastal waters of the Dam Tra O...and having previously been assigned to the BN reaction force...I knew the SRAPs, as a special operations unit, had some of the most qualified people in the Battalion! These were very courageous and disciplined people whom you could trust with your life!" — Albert L. Parsley, Jr., 1Lt., USA, USA(Ret)                                                                      
                                                                                                     

   In recognition for their unique service to the US Army and a grateful nation, it is altogether fitting and proper that we honor and commemorate the esprit de corps, dedication and gallantry of these men — their willingness to be the 'best among the best' and pay a 'special' tribute in memory of 1Lt. Leon "Larry" E. Walker, Jr. as they answered their nation's 'Call to Arms' — Spirit or Genius of War.*
 
   Like others before them they answered their nation's call in the proudest tradition of those who previously stepped forward placing themselves in harm's way in service to our nation.              




                     *  "The 'Genius' or 'Spirit of War' — bare-breasted, her arms flung wide rises
                               behind him [the warrior]. Screaming her fury she trys to rouse the warrior who has 
                                  fallen in battle..."  See 'Project for a Monument' to the defense of Paris
                                                                                                              — Augustine Rodin, 1879  
                                                                                 



Acknowledgement for their gracious contributions to this manuscript: Curtis E. Harper, LTC (Ret); Donald M. Harrington, SGM (Ret); Eldridge H. Holloway, SGM (Ret); Anthony J. Juliano, LTC (Ret); Joseph F. Mlinac, Jr.; Jack E. Noble; Albert L. Parsley, Jr., 1Lt. (Ret); Ventura F. Rodriguez ("Doc"); Ray W. Sarlin, Capt. (Ret); Robert Sollars; Andrew J. Soltis, Jr.; Dr. Christopher Ullman and James R. Woodall, Col., (Ret).
 
Note: Eligible members' names to be added when confirmed, May 26, 2002 — September 7, 2007. 
Inquiries may be directed to SLCanter

(Editorial Footnote)
¹ See above
² Airborne Static Line, Spring 2000, Don Lassen, Editor 
³ See http://www.rjsmith.com/my_unit.html [Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall, re. Groupment Mobile 100 and the Mang Yang Pass including the French Military Cemetery]
⁴ See 'LRRPs'; Special Operations; US Army Ranger's history ("Wikipedia"), etc. /  NOTE: While commanded by Airborne Ranger & Spec. Forces qualified personnel SRAP was not a Ranger unit per se and not all members were Ranger qualified or entitled to the Ranger Tab.  
⁵ Pending confirmation
⁶ See above

http://www.SRAP1-50th173rdABNBrigade.org is the website of "SRAP," 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep) 1968-69 [Copyright 2002-2008]
                                                                   
Disclaimer:
This site is not affiliated with the 173rd Airborne Brigade Association or the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Association. Rather, the site is dedicated to honor the men who valiantly served with the 'SRAP' and created its legacy within the annals of the 1/50th Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade -- Republic of Viet Nam (1968-69) 

(Editor's Note):  Because of the provisional status or command of this unit members were either appointed/selected or volunteered to serve with the SRAP. Not unlike other hazardous or dangerous military assignments, many volunteers 'quit' or were 'cut' (screened from the unit) and sent back to their former companies for failing to meet the qualifications or standards set during the planning and formation of this unit. Member roster provided herein has been confirmed by former platoon leaders/sergeants as well as other member personnel covering the period of the unit’s service. Upon investigation, whereby the claims of any individual alleging to have served with this unit as a member are found to be false, the findings and name of the ‘wannabe’ including name of any supporting group, board member(s) or individual(s) who harbor these people will be published to protect the public  and made known to all related associations or organizations including its membership as well as any active military commands. To make certain word gets out about these 'wannabes,' a special web "shame" page  is planned for publishing/disclosing all findings surrounding any investigation. 

See Stolen Valor, by B.G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley. “Stolen Valor is a tough, courageous book…documenting the FRAUD that has been so destructive to the true legacy of those who fought in Viet Nam.” — James Webb, former Secretary
of the Navy. See Pownetwork.org, "An Epidemic of Military Imposters"  by Steve Robinson, Sept. 2007. 

      "When I go to veterans' websites, I would like to believe that what I am reading there is true"
                                                                                                             —Michael Labovitch, Director, MN County Veteran Services, Jan, 2008.
      
       For what  shall it profit a man...if he shall gain the whole world (riches...recognition or approvals, social acceptance or standing) and 
                                         loose his own soul [Gehenna] —Mark 8:36            
                                                                                                                                                                                                    

Following 10 years of research and lengthy reviews, much remains unknown and abstruse about this unit, its past missions and methods and areas of operations—known only to a ‘time and place’ and by those who were there!

Copyright Sheldon L. Canter 2002-2008. All rights reserved.